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DUI St Petersburg Attorney (813) 222-2220 Lawyer

DUI St Petersburg Attorney Lawyer St Petersburg DUI St Pete DUI Board Certified Attorney Lawyer W.F. “Casey” Ebsary, Jr., St. Petersburg DUI Attorney  Lawyer, Board Certified Criminal Trial
UPDATE: 

Can St Petersburg Seize Vehicles in DUI Cases?


 One Florida town will join a few others in allowing police to seize the vehicle of a driving under the influence suspect and sell it back to him/her for around $500.00.




DUI St Petersburg Attorney Lawyer 
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(813) 222-2220

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Free Search You can Use Google to Search my Florida DUI Database for Free - If you do not find an answer, call me.


St Petersburg Will Try to Seize Vehicles in DUI Cases | Video

Can St Petersburg Seize Vehicles in DUI Cases? Video Below


St. Petersburg DUI Vehicle Seizure
One Florida town will join a few others in allowing police to seize the vehicle of a driving under the influence suspect and sell it back to him/her for around $500.00. 

The city legal team has stated, "There does not appear to be any legal impediment to adding driving under the influence as a basis for vehicle seizure and impoundment with a companion administrative fine. . . ." The language used by the St. Petersburg City Attorney is, "vehicle seizure and impoundment with a companion administrative fine. "

Other Florida cities have ordinances which include driving under the influence as a basis for seizing the vehicle in traffic cases. A statewide search of these municipalities lists these cities:

Dunnellon, FL - Provides a catchall. Ordinance reads: The vehicle was used, intended or attempted to be used, to facilitate the violation of any criminal statute and the operator of the vehicle has been taken into custody by the police department and such motor vehicle would thereby be left unattended. Additional language which authorizes vehicle impoundment if the police officer has probable cause to believe that the operator of the vehicle or other person in charge of the vehicle is incapacitated to such an extent as to be unable to provide for its custody, control, or removal.

Wildwood, FL - Provides a catchall. Ordinance reads: Is subject to being detained for any other reason if the police chief elects to proceed on same under the provisions hereof.

Atlantis, FL
Biscayne Park, FL
Hypoluxo, FL
Lantana, FL
Mangonia Park, FL
Port Richey, FL


DUI Vehicle Seizure Video



City of St. Petersburg Proposed Vehicle Seizure Ordinance


"Proposed amendments: Adding driving under the influence to the section will provide officers an additional tool to promote public safety and penalize dangerous driving choices in the City. There does not appear to be any legal impediment to adding driving under the influence as a basis for vehicle seizure and impoundment with a companion administrative fine pursuant to section 20-122. If the proposed change is approved, officers will be educated regarding this additional public safety tool. "

"The Department respectfully requests the following three amendments to City Code Section 20-122: (i) amend section (b) to include driving under the influence as a basis for an officer to seize and impound a vehicle; (ii) amend section (e)(2) regarding the scheduling of the optional preliminary hearing from two business days to five business days; (iii) amend section (f)(1) regarding the scheduling of the optional final hearing from two business days to five business days. "

Sources:

http://www.stpete.org/agenda%20packets/2017-10-05%20Council%20Agenda.pdf

http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/driving-drunk-in-st-pete-police-can-soon-impound-your-car/2340502

http://www.wtsp.com/news/local/arrested-for-dui-heres-the-city-in-tampa-bay-where-youll-now-be-paying-a-lot-more/482312655


Tampa Attorney BUI | Boating Under Influence | Gasparilla Arrest

BUI Boating Under the Influence Tampa Lawyer
Tampa Attorney BUI
Boating Under the Influence

Update: Sobriety Testing in Boating Under the Influence Cases


One Court recently found that an Officer with Fish and Wildlife Commission did not have a good reason to suspect that a crime was in progress. Florida Law Weekly reported the cop did not have a "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity which would justify detaining defendant, who had been stopped for slow speed zone violation, beyond the time necessary for issuing citation." 

"this Court finds that there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the detention beyond issuing the citation for the boating violation"

The evidence and the BUI charge was thrown out on a "Motion to suppress evidence obtained by law enforcement as result of field sobriety exercises."

Jump to the end of this page to see the court's reason.


What can boat operators expect during the Gasparilla celebration in Tampa, Florida?


Gasparilla Florida BUI Lawyer (Boating Under the Influence ) expects an uptick in enforcement for the Gasparilla Pirate Fest Weekend. Operating a vessel while impaired is a criminal offense. Under Florida boating laws, it is illegal to operate a boat or any type of watercraft while under the influence or impaired by alcohol. A BAC or blood alcohol content level of 0.08% or higher, can result in a charges also. Under the age of 21, a level higher than 0.02% can result in charges.

Quick Fact on Refusal to Submit to Testing


Vessel Operators who have previously refused to submit to chemical test can be charged with a separate misdemeanor crime. Learn more about the consequences of a second refusal to submit here.


In one recent Piratefest weekend there were 5 Gasparilla BUI Boating Under the Influence Arrests. The Police, Sheriff's Office, Coast Guard, and Florida Fish and Wildlife will be using a Mobile Facility this year to process arrests made on the water. See Tampa Attorney BUI Tampa Lawyer BUI Video Below.

Fla Stat 327.35 
Boating under the influence



Penalties for BUI - boating under the influence can include jail time, fines up to $500.00 for 1st offenses, fines up to $1,000 for 2nd offenses, and drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs. Those facing 3rd and 4th convictions of BUI are often charged with a felony instead of a misdemeanor.

Gasparilla Tampa, Florida BUI Boating Under the Influence Lawyer Attorney Video



BOAT3051 Florida Statute 327.35.1 Misd 2nd BOATING UNDER THE INFLUENCE

Fla Stat 327.35
Boating under the influence; penalties;
(1) A person is guilty of the offense of boating under the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if the person is operating a vessel within this state and:

(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893, when affected to the extent that the person’s normal faculties are impaired;

(b) The person has a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or

(c) The person has a breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

(2)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), subsection (3), or subsection (4), any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) shall be punished:

1. By a fine of:

a. Not less than $500 or more than $1,000 for a first conviction.

b. Not less than $1,000 or more than $2,000 for a second conviction; and

2. By imprisonment for:

a. Not more than 6 months for a first conviction.

Order Suppressing Evidence in a Boating Under the Influence Case


STATE OF FLORIDA v. SAMUEL ROBERT MOONEY, Defendant. County Court, 7th Judicial Circuit in and for Volusia County. Case No. 2016-103309MMDL. July 20, 2017. Steven Henderson, Judge.


ORDER

This case came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress for a hearing held on July 20, 2017, and this Court having heard testimony from witnesses and the arguments of counsel does find as follows:

FACTS

On June 4, 2016, Officer McKee of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) was on routine airboat patrol on Lake George in the St. Johns River near Marker 17. The officer was monitoring an area near that point that was marked as a slow speed zone, requiring operators of vessels to keep the bow of the boat in the water and to not create a wake. He observed a bass boat being operated by the Defendant proceeding through the zone in compliance with the no wake requirement. The officer testified that about 200 yards before the end of the slow speed zone, the Defendant accelerated his vessel, coming up on a plane and creating a wake in violation of the slow speed zone. The officer turned on his blue lights on his FWCC-marked airboat and proceeded to intercept the Defendant. The officer testified that the Defendant immediately complied with the officer's directions to stop his boat and turn off his engine. The officer testified that he kept his boat about 10 feet away from the Defendant's boat to avoid the boats colliding and causing any damage.

The officer testified that initially he couldn't hear what the Defendant was saying because the airboat engine was too loud. He also said that he could see an open beer container in the boat near the Defendant, but also conceded that he never touched the beer can and had no idea how long the beer can had been in the boat. He also never asked the Defendant who was drinking the beer or whether they had been drinking at all. There was no testimony that the can had condensation on it, nor was there any testimony that the can actually even contained any alcohol whatsoever. The officer testified that he asked the Defendant some routine, questions like if he knew where he was at, to which the Defendant replied he wasn't familiar with that area of Volusia County since he is from Putnam County. The officer asked for life jackets and the Defendant complied with his request. He asked who owned the boat, and the Defendant stated it was his boat.

The officer testified at the hearing that the Defendant's speech sounded slurred and his responses to questions were incoherent, but the officer also conceded that he doesn't know the Defendant and isn't familiar with how the Defendant normally speaks. The officer also could not elaborate on what he meant when he said the Defendant was incoherent, and conceded that the Defendant was able to answer his questions appropriately. He testified that the Defendant's appearance was that of a normal fisherman and that his eyes seemed glassy from the wind.

The officer testified that there was a passenger in the boat who was being belligerent and cursing, which caused the officer to be concerned for his personal safety. He testified that the Defendant occupied himself with getting the passenger to be quiet and to stop cursing the officer, which he finally was able to do.

Officer McKee admitted on cross examination that the bulk of his incident report was actually prepared 3 days after the initial contact and arrest was made, and that he had excluded from his report a number of details relating to the incident. He also admitted that given the passage of time since the arrest he could not recall all of the specifics relating to what exactly was said or done by the Defendant that seemed incoherent on the date of the arrest. He also admitted that it is not illegal to possess alcohol in a vessel in Volusia County, nor is it illegal to drink a beer on a boat.

Based on the presence of the beer can, the officer's testimony that the Defendant's speech sounded slurred, and his speeding in a no wake zone, the officer asked the Defendant to submit to field sobriety exercises (FSEs). The Defendant agreed and, at the officer's request, stepped onto the officer's boat to perform the exercises. There was no testimony that the Defendant had any difficulty with standing, walking, or jumping from one boat to the other. There was no testimony that the Defendant had any dexterity problems and there was no testimony that the Defendant had any odor of alcohol coming from his person. Furthermore, there was no testimony that the Defendant made any admissions or statements against interest relating to having consumed any alcohol prior to the request for the FSEs. Ultimately, the Defendant was arrested on suspicion of boating under the influence (BUI).

The defense filed this motion challenging the reasonable suspicion of the officer to detain the Defendant longer than reasonably necessary to issue him a citation for the speed zone violation and to begin conducting a BUI investigation.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Whenever any law enforcement officer encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, the officer may temporarily detail such person for the purpose of investigating the possible criminal conduct. See section 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2017).

In order to detain a defendant beyond the time necessary to issue a citation or warning, the officer must have “reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” Cresswell v. State, 564 So.2d 480 (Fla. 1990). (emphasis added) When reviewing the factors involved in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed, the totality of the circumstances must be considered and “include: the time of day; the appearance and behavior of the suspect; the appearance and manner of operation of any vehicle involved; and anything incongruous or unusual in the situation as interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge.” Grant v. State, 7l8 So.2d 238, 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) [23 Fla. L. Weekly D1969a].

To justify temporary detention of a person, there must be a “founded” suspicion in the mind of the police officer that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. A “founded” suspicion is one which has some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer when those circumstances are interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge. “Mere suspicion . . . is . . . random selection, sheer guesswork, or a hunch; it has no objective justification.” Elliott v. State, 597 So.2d 916, 917-18 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). “Both the founded suspicion standard and the probable cause standard require the officer to interpret a factual foundation in light of the officer's knowledge and experience. The difference between the two lies in the degree of probability.” Id. at 918.

Absent an articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the time an officer takes to issue a citation should last no longer than is necessary to make any required license or registration checks and to write the citation. See Maxwell v. State, 785 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) [26 Fla. L. Weekly D1445b].

CONCLUSION

In the case at bar, the basis for the officer's request to perform FSEs was the boating violation, the incoherent answers, the presence of the beer can, and the slurred speech. However, given the specific facts of this case viewed in light of the testimony presented at the suppression hearing, this Court finds that there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the detention beyond issuing the citation for the boating violation. There was no testimony of an odor of alcohol on the Defendant's person, there was no evidence of alcohol consumption by the Defendant beyond the mere suspicions of the officer due to the presence of the beer can that may or may not have even contained any alcohol, and there was no evidence of any other indicators of impairment like glassy, bloodshot eyes due to intoxication, flushed face, poor balance, or anything of like nature. According to the testimony, there was nothing inherently dangerous or incongruous about how the Defendant was operating his vessel.

In this Court's opinion, the testimony provided by the officer was contradictory. At first he testified that the Defendant was incoherent, but then he clarified and said he meant he couldn't hear the Defendant due to the engine noise from the airboat. He then testified that the Defendant was incoherent when responding to other questions but couldn't provide any specific examples of what he meant. At the same time he testified that the Defendant appeared to know where he was at, was able to provide proof of lifejackets immediately upon request, was able to answer questions about who owned the boat, was able to deal with the unruly passenger in an appropriate manner, and was able to move about both boats without any signs of impairment.

The only competent, uncontradicted evidence that was presented to the Court was that the Defendant had slurred speech. Without some additional evidence that the slurred speech was due to impairment by drugs or alcohol, this Court finds that to be insufficient evidence of impairment to establish the necessary reasonable suspicion of BUI to justify the continued detention of the Defendant.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Defendant's motion to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence is hereby GRANTED. All evidence obtained by law enforcement as a result of the field sobriety exercises and the Defendant's subsequent arrest for BUI are hereby suppressed as the fruits of the poison tree.




Drive Legal Again Program | DLAP | Suspended Drivers License

Get help getting a drivers license in Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida through the Drive Legal Again Program DLAP

Charged with Driving on a Suspended Driver's License?


Updated 2017: People who may have criminal traffic charges included driving with a suspended license due to problems with unpaid tickets can get some help.

The Hillsborough County State Attorneys in Tampa, Florida have a new program. It is called the Drive Legal Again Program. The program is known to lawyers, prosecutors, and judges as the "DLAP."  The Assistant State Attorneys in each of the criminal divisions can review and refer cases to the program and this may help people get back on the road. Your Attorney can reach out to the Prosecutor and see if you are eligible for the plan.

For further information please call:

(813) 374-0312

achacon@courtoptions.org.

"a full case plan to assist the offender in obtaining a valid driver's license"

Drive Legal Again Program Hillsborough County Florida Phone Number and Email
Drive Legal Again Program Hillsborough County Florida Phone Number and Email

What Kind of Traffic cases can be Referred to the DLAP Program?


Habitual Traffic Offender Beats 322.34 Charges in Florida

322.34(5), habitual traffic offender, hto, DWLSR, DWLSR Habitual Offender,

Who can be charged with Driving While License Suspended or Revoked as an Habitual Traffic Offender?


Driver was charged in Florida as a Habitual Traffic Offender who was driving with a suspended license. That is a serious felony in the Sunshine State. He "argued that he had never possessed a Florida driver license and therefore could not be convicted pursuant to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes."

Florida Law Weekly reports, "Defendants who have never possessed a driver license may not be charged under section 322.34(5), as having a driver license that has been revoked under the habitual traffic offender statute is a necessary element of the offense"

Case Excerpts

 

"defendants who have never possessed a driver license may not be charged under section 322.34(5)."

"The plain language of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, provides that an offender must have had his or her driver license revoked as a habitual traffic offender in order for the felony penalty to apply. The State cannot revoke a license that never existed. Consequently, a person cannot violate section 322.34(5) without ever having obtained a driver license."

"Where the Legislature enumerates items to the exclusion of others, the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius encourages the interpretation that the Legislature purposefully excluded items not mentioned."

More Information on Driving While License Suspended or Revoked


TRAF6078 DRIVING WHILE LICENSE REVOKED-HABITUAL OFFENDR
www.dui2go.com/2010/09/traf6078-driving-while-license-revoked.html
Sep 2, 2010 - Title XXIII MOTOR VEHICLES Chapter 322 DRIVERS' LICENSES 322.34 Driving while license suspended, revoked, canceled, or disqualified.

130 Ways to Go to Jail in Traffic Court | Florida Criminal Traffic ...
www.dui2go.com/2016/01/florida-criminal-traffic-charges-list.html
Jan 7, 2016 - Failure To Surrender Suspended License. Traf6053. 322.34.6. Fel. 3rd. Driving While License Cancelled Susp Revoked. Traf6054. 322.34.6.

TRAF6075 DRIVING W/LICENSE CANC SUSP OR REVOKED
www.dui2go.com/2010/09/traf6075-driving-wlicense-canc-susp-or.html
Jan 13, 2016 - 322.34.2A, Defense Attorney Tampa, DRIVING W/LICENSE CANC SUSP OR REVOKED. Driving with License Canceled Suspended or ...

Complete Text of Supreme Court of Florid

 

No. SC16-1170

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Petitioner, vs.

DARYL MILLER,

Respondent. 

[September 28, 2017] 

QUINCE, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in State v. Miller, 193 So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), which certified conflict with decisions of the Second, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal in Carroll v. State, 761 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Newton v. State, 898 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); and State v. Bletcher, 763 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we approve the Third District’ s decision below and disapprove the conflict cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion.

 

I. Background 

 

On May 21, 2014, Daryl Miller was charged with violating section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2017), which provides a third-degree felony penalty for “habitual traffic offenders” who drive with a driver license that has been revoked under section 322.264, Florida Statutes (2017). Miller filed a sworn motion to dismiss. In support of his motion, Miller argued that he had never possessed a Florida driver license and therefore could not be convicted pursuant to section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes. The trial courtgranted Miller’s motion and reduced his charges to driving without a valid driver license. The State appealed. 

The Third District affirmed the trial court’s order, aligning its decision with the First District’s decisionin Crain v. State, 79 So. 3d 118, 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). See Miller, 193 So. 3d at 1002. The Third District concluded that possession of a Florida driver license is a prerequisite for a section 322.34(5) offense and certified conflict with the Second, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal. Id. at 1002-03. We agree with the Third and First Districts that possession of a driver license is a prerequisite to a conviction pursuant to section 322.34(5).

 

II. Analysis 

 

The plain language and construction of a statute are reviewed de novo. See Polite v. State, 973 So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 2007). “When the statute is clear and unambiguous,” we use its plain language and avoid rules of statutory construction.Daniels v. Fla. Dept. of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005); see also W. Fla.Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So. 3d 1, 9 (Fla. 2012). We first examine the plain  language of the section under review. 

Section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, provides the following: 

Any person whose driver license has been revoked pursuant to s. 322.264 (habitual offender) and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. 

Section 322.264, Florida Statutes, defines a habitual traffic offender as a person who has accumulated a combination of specified offenses.1 The Legislature defined driver license as “a certificate that,subject to all other requirements of law, authorizes an individual to drive.” § 322.01(17), Fla. Stat. (2017).

Footnote 1

1. Section 322.264, Florida Statutes, provides the following: 

“Habitual traffic offender” defined.—A “habitual traffic offender” is any person whose record, as maintained by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, shows that such person has accumulated the specified number of convictions for offenses described in subsection (1) or subsection (2) within a 5-year period: 

(1) Three or more convictions of any one or more of the following offenses arising out of separate acts: 
(a)Voluntary or involuntary manslaughter resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle; (b) Any violation of s. 316.193, former s. 316.1931, or former s.860.01; 
(c)Any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used; 
(d)Driving a motor vehicle while his or her license is suspended or revoked;
(e)Failing to stop and render aid as required under the laws of this state in the event of a motor vehicle crash resulting in the death or personal injury of another; or 
(f)Driving a commercial motor vehicle while his or her privilege is disqualified.
 
(2)Fifteen convictions for moving traffic offenses for which points may be assessed as set forth in s. 322.27, including those offenses in subsection (1).
--------------------------------------------------------

The plain language of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, provides that an offender must have had his or her driver license revoked as a habitual traffic offender in order for the felony penalty to apply. The State cannot revoke a license that never existed. Consequently, a person cannot violate section 322.34(5) without ever having obtained a driver license.

The State contends that this Court must look to other sections of Chapter 322 to determine the plain meaning of “driver license” in section 322.34(5) because the plain meaning of a word is derived from its context. The State asks us to find “driver license” and “driving privilege” interchangeable, consistent with its practice of charging drivers who have never had a driver license under statutes with “driving privilege” penalties. However, statutory construction is inappropriate because section 322.34(5) is not ambiguous.

Even if section 322.34(5) were ambiguous as the State contends, the canons of statutory construction do not support the State’s interpretation. One rule of construction this Court employs is the principle of in pari materia, which provides that statutes with similar subjects should be construed together to synchronize their meaning and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. See Patrick v. Hess, 212 So. 3d 1039, 1042 (Fla. 2017). This Court also endeavors to give meaning to each word of a statute rather than treat any word as “mere surplusage.” Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 198-99 (Fla. 2007). Where the Legislature enumerates items to the exclusion of others, the canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius encourages the interpretation that the Legislature purposefully excluded items not mentioned. Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976). With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes. 

A person operating a motor vehicle on the roads of this State must possess a valid license issued by the State of Florida or fall under an exception to licensure. § 322.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). One exception includes nonresidents who possess a valid driver license issued by their home states. §§ 322.04(1)(c)-(d), Fla. Stat. (2017). Exceptions also exist for federal government employees operating a government vehicle for official business, any person operating a road machine or tractor, and any person operating a golf cart. §§ 322.04(1)(a)-(b), (e), Fla. Stat. (2017). 

Considering these sections in pari materia, the Legislature’suse of “driving privilege” refers to all the individuals who may lawfully operate vehicles on Florida’s roads, evenif they do not possess a Florida driver license. Individuals like Miller, who drive in Florida without ever having obtained a license or having an exemption to licensure, do not have any “driving privilege.” We cannot find that both terms mean the same thing because doing so improperly treats the words as “mere surplusage.” Heart of Adoptions, 963 So. 2d at 198-99. 

Individuals like Miller are guilty of a second-degree misdemeanor for violation of section 322.03, Florida Statutes. See § 322.39, Fla. Stat. (2017). The Legislature has not articulated enhanced penalties for individuals who accumulate multiple violations of section 322.03. The statute under review, section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes, only provides enhanced penalties for individuals who continue to drive after having had a valid driver license revoked. 

In contrast, the statute criminalizing driving under the influence (DUI) targets any person “driving or in actualphysical controlof a vehicle” while impaired by alcohol or other substances, including individuals who drive without ever having obtained a license and those who drive without having an exemption to licensure. See § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (2017). 

In addition, section 322.34(6)(a), Florida Statutes, contemplates a felony penalty for any person who has never obtained a license who kills or causes bodily injury to someone while driving. The Legislature could have included individuals who do not have a license or exception to licensure along with license holders in section 322.34(5) as it did in other subsections. See Thayer, 335 So. 2d at 817. It did not do so.

 

III. Conclusion

 

Having a driver license that has been revoked under the habitual traffic offender statute, section 322.264, Florida Statutes, is a necessary element of a section 322.34(5) offense. Therefore, defendants who have never possessed a driver license may not be charged under section 322.34(5). We approve the Third District’ s decision below and disapprovethe conflict cases tothe extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered. LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. 

CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED. CANADY, J., dissenting.

As part of a plea agreement in a separate case, the State has agreed that even if it were to prevail here and the charged violation of section 322.34(5) were to be reinstated against Miller, it will not continue to prosecute Miller for a violation of section 322.34(5) in this case. The question of whether Miller can be convicted of violating section 322.34(5) therefore is now moot. Because the parties are seeking a purely advisory opinion—an opinion that has no bearing on the disposition of this case—I would dismiss this proceeding. “It is the function of a judicial tribunal to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not . . . to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue.” Montgomery v.Dep’t of Health &Rehab. Servs., 468 So. 2d 1014, 101617 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

Contrary to the State’ s claims, this casedoes not fall in the category of cases “capable of repetition yet evading review.” Johnson v. State, 60 So. 3d 1045, 1049 (Fla. 2011) (quoting State v. Matthews, 891 So. 2d 479, 484 (Fla. 2004)). The State itself is wholly responsible for rendering this case moot. A party should not be heard to assert that a recurring issue will evade review when that party itself has rendered moot the case presenting the issue for review. Accordingly, I dissent. POLSTON, J., concurs. 




Source: 
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2017/sc16-1170.pdf

http://www.floridalawweekly.com/newsystem/login.php?reason=&target_page=/newsystem/showfile.php?file=../files/issues/vol42/sco/831a.htm&lib=flw

Can a Sleeping Driver be charged with DUI in Florida?

Actual Physical Control, Sleeping Driver, DUI, Probable Cause
Actual Physical Control
Sleeping Driver
DUI, Probable Cause

What happens when a cop approaches a sleeping DUI Driver?


The Facts:

Deputy approaches legally parked car
Makes an approach to vehicle
Second approach to vehicle
Deputy parks patrol car behind suspect
Driver seen with GPS on dash
DUI cop has a "hunch" driver is DUI
Arrests driver

The Ruling:

Court found insufficient basis for a DUI investigation.

The Reasons:

One commentator has observed, "Deputy had legitimate reason to pull alongside defendant's vehicle, which was stopped on roadside at night in isolated location, to conduct wellness check -- Fact that deputy shone flashlight into vehicle and told defendant to roll down window did not convert encounter into investigatory stop -- Where deputy saw that defendant was alert and conscious and defendant responded to inquiry about his well-being, deputy's subsequent actions of parking patrol vehicle behind defendant's vehicle with lights activated and directing defendant to turn off vehicle and provide identification was unlawful investigatory stop -- Motion to suppress is granted." 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 829a

Quotes from a Recent DUI Court Opinion


"In most DUI cases, a traffic stop is made because the officer has probable cause that a traffic infraction has occurred or the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See State v. Wimberly, 988 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D1856a] and Origi v. State, 912 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly D2302a]. There is also a justifiable reason for a traffic stop if there is “. . . a legitimate concern for the safety of the motoring public [which] can warrant a brief investigatory stop to determine whether a driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence in situations less suspicious than that required for other types of criminal behavior.” State, Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. DeShong, 603 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)." 

"Once Dep. Woell saw that the Defendant was conscious and able to make a response to his inquiry regarding whether he was all right, even if it was poorly done, there should have been more of an effort to discern if there was truly a concern for the Defendant's safety before taking the next steps. The Defendant had done nothing illegal. He had pulled off the road in a proper fashion and had not affected other traffic. He was able to roll down his window and respond to the officer, albeit incoherently in the Deputy's view. There was no visible injury, no blood or vomit. The Defendant was alert and conscious. Tellingly, the Deputy said, while being cross-examined, that he saw (from a decent distance) that the Defendant had bloodshot eyes (the cause of which could be from many reasons) and that he had a hunch the driver was impaired."

"[T]he second approach (by parking behind the Defendant, walking up to the driver's door, and directing him to turn off the car and to provide identification) as not a true welfare check. If he had made more than one inquiry while he was alongside the Defendant, perhaps raised his voice one time to try to get a clearer response, or articulated with more specificity how this particular driver looked to be in some possible distress, this Court's conclusion may have been different. It would be a slippery slope to give an officer carte blanche to use a well-being concern to get around the need for a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop."

"Based on the circumstances and the case law, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED."







Complete Sleeping Driver Actual Physical Control DUI Court Opinion


STATE OF FLORIDA, Plaintiff, vs. ROBERT CODY NANCARROW Defendant. County Court, 7th Judicial Circuit in and for Volusia County. Case No. 2016-301820-MMDB, Division 80. October 16, 2016. Bryan A. Feigenbaum, Judge. Counsel: Andrew Draper, Assistant State Attorney, for Plaintiff. G. Kipling Miller, Koleilat & Miller, for Defendant.


ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on September 14, 2016 for a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence pursuant to Rule 3.190 Fla. R. Crim. P.; the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and Article 1, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution. The Court, having taken notice of the court file, having listened to the testimony of the witnesses, and having considered the arguments from counsel, makes the following findings upon which it enters this Order:

On the late evening of February 14, 2016, around 11 p.m., Deputy Woell of the Volusia County Sheriff's Office was driving westbound on the 1800 block of Taylor Road. This is a dark area in unincorporated Volusia County; there are no businesses or private homes alongside the road and there are no streetlights around.

There is a long bend in this stretch of road and as Dep. Woell was following a line of two or three cars near this curve, one car pulled completely off the road and onto the grassy shoulder. There was no other abnormal driving pattern and this maneuver did not affect the other vehicles. There was no testimony that any of the other vehicles had to brake or swerve.

Dep. Woell pulled alongside the stopped car, between the wood line and the passenger side of the car. He did not turn on his police siren or any flashing lights and did not get on a public address system. There was only one occupant, the driver, who turned out to be the Defendant. Dep. Woell said he pulled over out of a concern for the motorist to make sure everything was all right.

According to Dep. Woell, as he looked over at the Defendant, the Defendant was just staring straight ahead. The Deputy thought it unusual that a driver would not acknowledge his presence, seeing as how he was in a marked police car, so he pointed a flashlight into the car. At that time, the Defendant rolled down the passenger's side window and stared at the police officer. Dep. Woell asked if he was okay and he claimed the Defendant looked down to the passenger's side floorboard area and said something incoherent. Dep. Woell noted that the Defendant was alert, conscious, and was not slumped over and the Deputy made no mention of seeing any visible injury. On cross-examination, Dep. Woell also testified he saw that the Defendant had bloodshot eyes and that he had a hunch the Defendant might be impaired. He conceded that there were no other signs of impairment.

In order to explain his subsequent actions, Dep. Woell claimed that his original concerns for the driver had not dissipated. Dep. Woell thought, without clearly articulating why, that the Defendant was acting in an abnormal manner. He mentioned several scenarios he had been involved in, including situations where a driver was having a panic attack, an adverse reaction to medication, or a medical emergency such as a stroke, but never linked any prior experience with this particular driver's behavior.

The Defendant testified that he pulled off the road since he was lost. He was staring at the UPS navigation system set up in the middle of his dashboard when a car pulled alongside him and someone shined a flashlight into his car and yelled for him to roll down his window. Once he complied, he was asked if he was okay and he replied that he was fine. He surmises he did not say it loud enough to be clearly heard.

Dep. Woell decided to put his vehicle in reverse and now park behind the Defendant's car. He did not put on any takedown or flashing lights, but did turn on rear flashing blue lights to warn other traffic of his presence and they most likely would have been noticeable by the Defendant on this dark road. As the Deputy approached the driver's side window, the window was already rolled down. Dep. Woell asked the Defendant to turn off his car and to provide his driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Dep. Woell said he began noticing several signs of impairment including the odor of alcohol, glassy eyes, and slurred speech. The Defendant had a great deal of difficulty in finding his driver's license. He claimed he could not find his wallet three times before realizing he had his wallet on him.

The Deputy returned to his own vehicle and began running the information, including performing a warrants check. According to the police reports, the first time of contact with the driver was at 11:10 p.m. Having now seen signs of impairment which led him to believe a DUI investigation was appropriate, Dep. Woell called for back-up at 11:28 p.m. The shift supervisor, Sgt. Amendolare, arrived about 10 minutes later, at 11:39 p.m., and the DUI investigation began.

Dep. Woell had the experience and background to have started the DUI investigation on his own, but testified several factors led him to call for assistance for safety reasons: the dark area where the two vehicles were parked and the bend in the road next to where they were located; the lack of a flat surface to conduct field sobriety exercises [FSEs] except for the road itself since the grassy shoulder was sloped downward; the need for another police car to block traffic if they were going to do FSEs at the scene; and the relative size of the Defendant compared to Dep. Woell.

The defense argues that there was an improper seizure along the side of the road first by shining the flashlight into the Defendant's car and then by parking behind the car and approaching the driver's side window and making direct commands. Secondly, the defense argues that even if there was a valid stop, there was an unlawful detention given the time between the first contact and when the DUI investigation began, around 28 minutes later.

The State initially argued that the defense did not present evidence to show standing and that they did not meet their initial burden of proof under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190 (g)(3) which requires, in a motion to suppress, “. . . the defendant shall present evidence supporting the defendant's position and the state may offer rebuttal evidence.”

The Court took judicial notice of the court file and the allegations in the motion to suppress to find that there was no search warrant issued in this case. See Fla. Stat. § 90.202(6) (court may take judicial notice of the court file). Once that finding is made, the burden is the on the prosecution to prove the validity of the police's actions under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Hinton, 305 So. 2d 804 (4th DCA 1975); State v. Schubert, 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 782a (Fla. 17th Jud. Cir., Broward Co. Ct., Dec. 12, 2015); and State v. Dawkins, Donaldson, et al, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 170a (Fla. 4th Jud. Cir., Duval Co. Ct., Oct. 23, 2012).

All warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The burden is on the State to prove the validity of a search by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Thompson, 72 So. 3d 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) [36 Fla. L. Weekly D2236a].

Did Dep. Woell make proper initial contact with the Defendant and, if that was characterized as an encounter, when did that contact change from an encounter to an investigatory stop? Was there a legitimate reason for that change in status at the time it became an investigatory stop?

The Florida Supreme Court described three distinct types of police-citizen contacts and they are often fluid situations. “The first level is considered a consensual encounter and involves only minimal police contact. During a consensual encounter a citizen may either voluntarily comply with a police officer's requests or choose to ignore them. Because the citizen is free to leave during a consensual encounter, constitutional safeguards are not invoked.” Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993). The second level is “an investigatory stop.” See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). For a police officer to lawfully detain a citizen, “an investigatory stop requires a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Mere suspicion is not enough to support a stop.” Popple, Id. at 186. The third level “involves an arrest which must be supported by probable cause that a crime has been or is being committed.” Id.

The fact that Dep. Woell pulled alongside the Defendant's parked car did not automatically create a traffic stop. See State v. Wimbush, 668 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) [21 Fla. L. Weekly D506b] and State v. Carley, 633 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). He did not use lights or siren and in no manner direct the Defendant to pull over.

In most DUI cases, a traffic stop is made because the officer has probable cause that a traffic infraction has occurred or the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See State v. Wimberly, 988 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D1856a] and Origi v. State, 912 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) [30 Fla. L. Weekly D2302a]. There is also a justifiable reason for a traffic stop if there is “. . . a legitimate concern for the safety of the motoring public [which] can warrant a brief investigatory stop to determine whether a driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence in situations less suspicious than that required for other types of criminal behavior.” State, Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. DeShong, 603 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

Moreover, a police officer has a responsibility to make a well-being check if there is a reason to be concerned for the safety of a citizen, whether they are in a car or not. “It is well recognized that police officers may conduct welfare checks and that such checks are considered consensual encounters that do not involve constitutional implications.” Dermio v. State, 112 So. 3d 551, 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) [38 Fla. L. Weekly D776a]. See also Blice v. State, 825 So. 2d 447, 449 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) [27 Fla. L. Weekly D1705a] (“Not knowing whether he was ill, intoxicated, or merely asleep, the officers were duty-bound to investigate and to render assistance if needed. To do otherwise would be a dereliction of their duty.”); Gentles v. State, 50 So. 3d 1192, 1198-9 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) [35 Fla. L. Weekly D2900a] (“In keeping with such community caretaking responsibilities, [an officer] could properly check the defendant's status and condition to determine whether he needed any assistance or aid. This type of limited contact has been deemed a reasonable and prudent exercise of an officer's duty to protect the safety of citizens.”, citing to Lightbourne v. State, 438 So. 2d 380, 388 (Fla. 1983)); Greider v. State, 977 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) [33 Fla. L. Weekly D949b]; Vitale v. State, 946 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) [32 Fla. L. Weekly D164a] (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid . . . .”, citing to Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978); and State v. Sooy, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 997b (Fla. 7th Jud. Cir., Volusia Cty. Ct., Aug. 3, 2006).

The facts in the instant case, like the fact patterns in Greider, Gentles, and Dermio, show an encounter continuum between an officer and a defendant. Given the time of night and the isolated location where the Defendant pulled off the road, Dep. Woell had a legitimate reason, if not a duty, to pull alongside the Defendant and make sure everything was all right. A wide gamut of reasons from the minor to the serious could be involved when a driver pulls off the road: mechanical problems with the vehicle, a medical emergency, wanting to take or make a phone call or respond to a text, a lost contact lens, or being lost and wanting to get one's bearings are just a few of the possibilities.

Shining a flashlight into the vehicle or even telling the Defendant to roll down the window did not necessarily convert the initial encounter into an investigatory stop. See Dermio, id; Wimbush, id.; State v. Goodwin, 36 So. 3d 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) [35 Fla. L. Weekly D1289b]; Blake v. State, 939 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D2510a]; Pacheco v. State, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 255a (Fla. 17th Jud. Cir. Ct., Nov. 9, 2012); and State v. Evans, 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 451a (Fla. 18th Jud. Cir., Brevard Cty. Ct., Jan. 28, 2014).

Once Dep. Woell saw that the Defendant was conscious and able to make a response to his inquiry regarding whether he was all right, even if it was poorly done, there should have been more of an effort to discern if there was truly a concern for the Defendant's safety before taking the next steps. The Defendant had done nothing illegal. He had pulled off the road in a proper fashion and had not affected other traffic. He was able to roll down his window and respond to the officer, albeit incoherently in the Deputy's view. There was no visible injury, no blood or vomit. The Defendant was alert and conscious. Tellingly, the Deputy said, while being cross-examined, that he saw (from a decent distance) that the Defendant had bloodshot eyes (the cause of which could be from many reasons) and that he had a hunch the driver was impaired.

The State relied on Dermio, id., but there are many distinguishing factors that led the Second DCA to find that opening the driver's door in that case did not transform that encounter into a stop. The driver/defendant in that case was parked in a bar parking lot at 3:30 a.m. with the engine running and the lights on. The driver appeared to be asleep and was only awakened by the officer's tapping a flashlight onto the car window. The officer made three distinct attempts to get a coherent response from the driver before taking the further action of opening the door out of a concern for the driver's safety. As pointed out in Dermio, “. . . the deputy's concern for Dermio's safety in this case had not yet been alleviated because Dermio continued to be incoherent and ‘out of it'.” [emphasis added] Id. at 556. Dep. Woell, by contrast, had just seen the Defendant driving properly and only made one attempt to check on his welfare. As mentioned earlier, there are a plethora of legitimate reasons why a driver may pull over in the same manner as the Defendant.

In Greider, id., an officer approached a legally parked car that had towels covering both the passenger and driver's windows of the car, concealing the interior as if they were curtains. The officer had a safety concern and approached the passenger's side to see the occupant(s). The driver rolled down the passenger's window and said all was fine. Even though his concern for the occupant's welfare was dispelled, the officer went around to the driver's side and ordered the driver to roll down that window. “We do not ignore [the officer's] testimony that he possessed suspicions regarding the unusual circumstances of the towels covering the windows, even after he had been assured all was well. However, a suspicion, by itself, may reflect well on the officer's instincts but it does not meet the Fourth Amendment's requirement of ‘at least reasonable suspicion that the individual seized is engaged in wrongdoing.' Here, there was no evidence of criminal activity. This event was a second level citizen encounter, an investigatory stop, undertaken without appropriate legal justification.” Greider, id. at 793, citing to Popple at 186. Even if Dep. Woell had not had his welfare concern completely dispelled, there should have been a greater effort made, at least further inquiry, before pulling behind the Defendant's car, blue warning lights illuminating the dark road, approaching the driver's window, instructing him to turn off his engine, and making requests for license and registration. Just like the defendant in Greider, the Defendant here would not feel free to disregard the officer's command, end the encounter, and drive away. The Florida Supreme Court “. . . has consistently held that a person is seized if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the encounter and depart.” Popple, id. at 188, citing to Jacobson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 1985).

In Gentles, id., an officer approached a parked car in a closed mall parking lot inhabited by a driver who appeared asleep. The car's engine was running. The officer awakened the driver and ordered him to turn off the engine. The Fourth DCA found that the officer had not shown a reasonable concern for the driver's safety before telling him to shut off the car. While the officer had a community caretaker function that could allow him to see if the driver needed any assistance, there has to be a specific concern, as opposed to a generalized concern, for the driver's safety to allow this encounter to continue with greater intrusion by the officer. Id., at 1199-1200.

Dep. Woell's testimony causes concern that he made the second approach (by parking behind the Defendant, walking up to the driver's door, and directing him to turn off the car and to provide identification) as not a true welfare check. If he had made more than one inquiry while he was alongside the Defendant, perhaps raised his voice one time to try to get a clearer response, or articulated with more specificity how this particular driver looked to be in some possible distress, this Court's conclusion may have been different. It would be a slippery slope to give an officer carte blanche to use a well-being concern to get around the need for a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. “. . . [I]nvestigatory stops based solely upon an inarticulable hunch or unparticularized suspicion are invalid.” Keeling v. State, 929 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) [31 Fla. L. Weekly D1569a].

Based on the finding that the second contact between Dep. Woell and the Defendant was an investigatory stop and not an encounter, the issue about the time of the Defendant's detention on the side of the road before the back-up arrived to begin the DUI investigation is moot.

Based on the circumstances and the case law,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED.



Source: 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 829a

Florida Vehicular Homicide Black Box SDM Vehicle Download

Search Warrant for a Vehicle Event Data Recorder / SDM
Do Police Need a Search Warrant
for a Vehicle Event Data Recorder / SDM?

Do Police Need a Search Warrant for a Vehicle Event Data Recorder / SDM?


Tampa, Florida Board Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer, Attorney W.F. ''Casey'' Ebsary, Jr. notes that some vehicles have a sensing and diagnostic module ( SDM ), also known as a ''black box.'' Prosecutors alleged recently, data from a Corvette that was downloaded from the black box revealed that a defendant's speed was 103 m.p.h. five seconds before impact and 98 m.p.h. one second before impact. The Speed limit was 40 m.p.h. A recent court ruling noted, ''A search warrant for property may be issued '[w]hen any property constitutes evidence relevant to proving that a felony has been committed.' Section 933.02(3), Fla. Stat. (2006).''

Updated 2017

Another Court has agreed that Florida Police need a search warrant to download the data from a motor vehicle's black box. Search Warrant Required for Vehicle Event Data Recorder . Here is some key information form the update:

Florida DUI Vehicle Event Data Recorder Key Quotes


"An event data recorder is a device installed in a vehicle to record “crash data” or technical vehicle and occupant information for a period of time before, during, and after a crash."

"It is an issue of first impression in Florida whether a warrant is required to search an impounded vehicle’s electronic data recorder or black box."

"17 states have laws addressing event data recorders, which provide under what circumstances the data may be downloaded."

"[T]he constant, unrelenting black box surveillance of driving conditions could contribute to a reasonable expectation of privacy in the recorded data."

Back Ground Story


Courts have held that ''the rate of speed of a vehicle can be firmly shown . . . to be so excessive under the circumstances that to travel that fast under the conditions is by itself a reckless disregard for human life or the safety of persons exposed to the speed.'' The application for the search warrant contained the following:

Accident occurred on a Monday afternoon at 12:48 p.m. in a residential area; Car traveling in excess of 70 m.p.h. in a 40-m.p.h. zone; vehicles traveled one-hundred-twenty-five feet after impact; lack of pre-impact tire marks suggested braking did not occur; and witness heard the gears ''chirp'' as the car accelerated to a faster gear. These facts showing excessive speed in a residential area were enough probable cause to get a search warrant for the car's black box.

These allegations are from court records and the defendant is presumed innocent.


Criminal Traffic Charges? Tell Me Your Story Toll Free 1-877-793-9290 .

Criminal Traffic Charges - SDM Black Box Download

Free Arrest Warrant Service | Check Florida Warrant for Free

Florida Arrest Warrant Search

Help Clearing Up a Florida Arrest Warrant? 



Call Casey at 813-222-2220.

Free Service | Use the Arrest Warrant Service to Check for Florida Arrest Warrants

Please note: The database contains Florida warrant information as reported to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement by law enforcement agencies throughout the state and authorized for release to the public. FDLE and the reporting agencies strongly recommend that no citizen take any individual action based on this information. 

Warning:

This information is not to be used as a confirmation that any warrant is active, or as probable cause for an arrest. Information contained herein should not be relied upon for any type of legal action.

Source: http://pas.fdle.state.fl.us/pas/person/displayWantedPersonsSearch.a

Tampa DUI Bars and Restaurants - Map of Hot Spots

Dine, Dance, and Detained: How to Avoid Tampa DUI Charges - Tips From an Expert 

Hyde Park DUI Lawyer Which Bars are Cops Watching?
Dine, Dance, and Detain
DUI attorneys in Tampa know there are certain locations generally and several bars, specifically that generate much of the DUI traffic stop action for law enforcement agencies. Police are tracking where drivers who have been arrested reported having their last drink. That led us to a study of where police are on most nights.


Which Bars are Cops Watching?


Unfortunately, for the bars on the lists published by the Tampa Tribune, these bar owners cannot control the police or the surveillance of their locations and their customers. Not surprisingly, in general, the neighborhoods close to the Tampa Police Department headquarters are hot spots for DUI arrests. Hyde Park and Ybor City are frequent entries on incident reports according to the media. Best advice - make sure to arrange a ride home.

"Aside from the decision to waive their Miranda rights, the only good that comes of honest answers to these questions will be finding out where drivers can go to increase the probability of an arrest ending the evening."

Video of a driving under the influence traffic law enforcement officer from court proceedings at the Hillsborough County Courthouse told drivers what many already knew - cops watch bar parking lots. Now drivers and visitors to the area can know statistically what geographic areas are targeted and which bars they may be watching.

Avoiding DUIs in Tampa from WF Casey Ebsary Jr 813.222.2220

DUI Pasco Lawyer Attorney Florida 813-222-2220

DUI Attorney Pasco County FL
Fighting for You, a Friend, or a Loved One

"Trooper sets records for DUI arrests."

Call 813-222-2220 


What happens to my driver's license after a Pasco County DUI Arrest?


If you refuse to take a breath, blood, or urine test after being arrested for DUI, or if results of your breath test were .08% or above, your license will be suspended unless a written demand for an administrative hearing is filed within 10 days after arrest.  Call 813-222-2220 for help now.

DUI News Update from Pasco County, Florida


Video Florida Highway Patrol Arrest Contest

I continue to be concerned with the game that some police agencies have made out of DUI arrests. Cops in Pasco County Florida set out to break a record of some sort and informed the media that a DUI record was broken. The headline reads: "Trooper sets records for DUI arrests."

Video - Come on Vacation Leave on Probation - Spring Break on the Suncoast -

Several colleges and universities have spring breaks that overlap this year. Not only are the universities of Tampa, South Florida, and St. Pete College all on Spring Break on the Suncoast at the same time, there are students arriving to the Tampa Bay area from all over the country.

"seemingly minor charges can result in a 
permanent criminal record"

Come on Vacation Leave on Probation


Police are stepping up enforcement efforts while all the students are here. Many of the roads on the beaches have very low speed limits and expect strict enforcement of all traffic laws, including  speed limits. Here is a video that has been produced to put the word out that police will have a zero tolerance policy towards  some interesting activities that  students may be inclined to try. Do not Come on Vacation Leave on Probation.
 . Previous Tampa Bay Area Spring Break Story follows

Previous Tampa Bay Area Spring Break Story


Here is a story about the types of tactics and criminal charges that police and prosecutors will use. As we previously reported, a "non-discretionary “zero tolerance” policy to encountering and arresting Spring Break visitors. Police are using fairly vague and discretionary charges, such as Disorderly Conduct Florida Statute 877.03. These seemingly minor charges can result in a permanent criminal record. " 

DUI in Polk County Florida - Defense Options

DUI Lawyer Polk County, FL

Polk DUI Attorney

813-222-2220

Charged With Driving Under the Influence? 

Help for You, a Friend, or Loved One





A Polk DUI Lawyer is standing by. DUI / DWI / Drunk Driving is serious charge to have on your driving record in Polk County. You need a serious defense. DUI Defense can be challenging. The police are the main state witnesses. Scientific evidence from the Intoxilyzer 8000 breath test or blood tests may be presented against you. Damaging evidence against you may include: the breath test, officer's testimony, and Standard Field Sobriety Tests.


Search Casey’s Huge Polk County Florida DUI Database for Free




W.F. ''Casey Ebsary, Jr.'' is a Board Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer and DUI - DWI attorney who helps in Polk County, Florida, has knowledge of these issues, and can help you establish your defense against these and other traffic offenses.

Polk D U I Arrests by the Numbers


We uncovered a report that there are about 1300 to as many as 1600 people arrested each year for DUI in Polk County according to arrest statistics for each Florida County. The most recent traffic citation and DUI Arrest numbers for Polk County are available on our Polk County Florida DUI Law Blog.